

Monitoring Political Parties' Spending in Nigerian Elections: What Role for the Press and other Public Institutions?

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Abstract. Aside from the Press in its sobriquet as the Fourth Estate of the realm of political governance, two principal institutions that are responsible for the monitoring of financial spending of political parties before, during and after general elections on behalf of the Nigerian State are the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC). While the Electoral Act indeed specifies the spending limits for political parties and their candidates, the extent of compliance to the Electoral Act concerning finances by both political parties and their Monitors is of great concern in this paper. This is against the background of how billions of Naira meant for war prosecution against terrorism was said to have been misappropriated by Nigeria's national government towards the 2015 General Elections. This paper reviews the roles of the press and other principal agents responsible for monitoring parties political campaigns spending in the last elections. It argues that in spite of the change mantra of new party that forms Nigeria's national government after the old lost elections, the nature of party spending for elections in Nigeria is yet far from transparent and the roles of the public institutions saddled with the responsibility including the Press is called to question.

Keywords: Spending, Public Institutions, Elections, Parties, Governance.

1. Background and Introduction

The Nigerian State was awash with the revelation of how 5.4 billion Naira meant for the

prosecution of war against terrorism/Boko Haram in the north east, Nigeria was shared among politicians for other purposes than the money was meant , including funding of political parties' campaign towards the 2015 General Elections under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. President Jonathan lost the 2015 elections to his challenger General Muhammadu Buhari who was sworn in as President in May 2015. The campaign mantra of General Buhari's party was change and fight against corruption. The exposure of the diversion of the fund was therefore seen as a true fight against corruption by the new government.

This paper's focus is not on corruption directly. Its concern is on political parties' spending in an election and the roles expected of public institutions assigned for such activities in the Nigerian State. It is therefore of utmost importance to interrogate the link between this corrupt proceeds and funding of campaign activities in the 2015 elections on the one part and on the other examine how political parties are generally funded for election purpose under the monitoring guide of the specific public institutions assigned to handle such for and on behalf of the Nigerian State. The principal institutions in this regard are the Press and the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) and Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in particular.

Odunlami (2015) posits that there is a negative relationship between press freedom and corruption on the one hand, and that there is always a positive correlation between press

freedom, transparent governance and sustainable development on the other. Hence, the role of the press or the mass media in engendering accountability through an open and transparent society has always received world-wide acknowledgement.

The press, a generic term for the mass media, enjoys the universal accolade as the fourth estate of the realm of governance. By this appellation the mass media are conferred with the responsibility of the watch/guard dog of the society by providing a public sphere platform for x-raying society and cross-fertilization of ideas for agenda setting through debates including surveillance functions all aimed at ensuring transparent governance by holding the governor accountable to the governed. All of these goals are geared towards ensuring an all-round sustainable development for the society. As the oxygen of democracy and by extension development, the mass media through their traditional roles of reporting and interpreting news set agenda for government and societal preoccupations. This is aside from serving as both guard/watchdog over governmental and other powerful institutions of society.

On the other hand, Section 86 (1-4) of the Electoral Act 2010, empowers INEC, as a public institution, with the role to monitor and keep records of the activities of all registered political parties, including their financial activities. As a base line, the Electoral Act specifies the spending limits for political parties and their candidates. For example, no presidential candidate is allowed to spend more than N1bn on campaign. A governorship candidate is restricted to two hundred million naira (N200m) and no senatorial candidate can spend more than forty million naira (N40m). The law equally puts a ceiling on the amount of money an individual or association can donate to a political campaign. It is within these limits that INEC is expected to monitor spending and financial conducts of politicians concerning elections. The extent of effectiveness and efficient service delivery of this constitutional role in a Nigeria State is part of the interest of this paper.

2. **Role for Public Institutions: Between Modernism (Bureaucracy) and Post-Modernism (Adhocracy)**

Max Weber's theoretical principle of the traditional model of public administration (bureaucracy) dominated most of the 20th century and it is the most universally acceptable and globally established form of mass organization (Onyeonoru, 2002, Katsamunsk, 2012). The explanation of events and activities of public institutions about her roles in the process of service delivery to the society can therefore be conveniently placed within the context of Weber's theoretical postulations on public administration.

The phenomenon requiring explanation in this context is the role of public institutions saddled with the responsibilities of monitoring political parties' spending in elections in Nigerian State particularly the 2019 General Elections. And apart from the press, the two institutions under focus here are INEC and EFCC. While the INEC is saddled with the role to monitor and keep records of the activities of all registered political parties, including their financial activities, the EFCC is constitutionally empowered as a Nigerian law enforcement agency that investigates financial crimes such as advance fee fraud (419 frauds) and money laundering.

Within the Weber's theoretical principle therefore, both institutions fit properly in the fundamental features of bureaucracy, which include 'a hierarchy of officials expressed in tall administrative structures and span of control, centralization, division of labor, specialization, standardization, impersonality, administration by formal rules etc. – all of which promote organizational rationality' (Onyeonoru, 2002).

The aspects of these characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy and theoretical principle that will be on focus in explaining the roles of the public institution under study are the impartiality and centralization principle. For the impartiality principle:

The ideal official under such principle is expected to perform his or her duties in a spirit

of formalistic impersonality-in compliance with official rules. This is aimed at ensuring objectivity. By implication, he or she is neither guided by personal likes or dislikes, nor give room for such emotions as hatred or passion for colleagues. Official do not show favour towards friends or relatives. The action of official is therefore rational rather than affective or traditional (Onyeonoru, 2002:281).

And for the centralization principle:

The competence of the official follows the principle of hierarchy as every lower office is structured under the control and supervision of a higher one. This ensures that, first, no office is left without supervision or control and second, that compliance is systematically ensured and reinforced

The rationality of officials of INEC and EFCC in the Nigerian State is being called to question concerning the principle of centralization (control and compliance) and impartiality of bureaucracy as suggested by Weber in relations to their constitutional roles as public institutions established for a purpose.

The suspect of the affective and traditional actions of both institutions by Nigerians and politicians is a challenge to the claim of rationality and indispensability of bureaucracy in public administration as claimed by Weber in his theory and principle. To the extent that it is difficult for both institutions under review to be impartial it becomes equally difficult to accept the explanatory power of Weber's thesis of the role of public institutions in public administration.

Perhaps the gaps created by the two elements in Weber's bureaucracy, which posed a challenge to public administration was compensated by post-modern organization that in the argument of Clegg 'tends to be small or located in small sub units of larger organizations....its management structure is functionally decentralized, eclectic and participative, overlapping in many ways with non-managerial functions' (cited in Onyeonoru, 2002: 285). Indeed, its features are contrary to the modern bureaucratic elements.

The bureaucratic thesis of Weber might have explained organization activities sufficiently in the past, the dynamics of the society in the contemporary world has compelled a further explanation of organizational activities beyond Weber hence, the post-modern organization.

Such dynamics, in the case of Nigeria, is the Federal structure of Nigeria, which many have condemned, through ethnic and intellectual agitations, to be unwieldy for proper administrative activities that would be beneficial to the generality of the people (National Confab Report, 2014; Alliyu, Obioha, and Akin-Lawal, 2016; Akinwale, 2018; Adetola, 2019). Post-modern thesis therefore is a manifestation of shift away from strong power structures typical of Taylorist and Fordist centralized and strict control systems. They are antithetical to bureaucratic structures typified by rules, hierarchies, discipline, centralization, predictability etc. instead, post-modernist forms emphasize a rather weak power form marked with decentralized, self-regulating, fluid and flexible structures with no clear centre of power or spatial location (Mulgan 1989; Parker 1992:4 cited in Onyeonoru, 2002).

The various arguments of the proponents of a restructured Nigeria seems to have lots in common with post-modernism thesis as contrary to modernization thesis, which in this case is obsolete and ineffective in its explanative strength of events and phenomenon bordering on public administration in Nigeria.

3. INEC/ EFCC and Challenges of Monitoring Party Finances

Both INEC and EFCC have constitutional responsibilities towards the running of the Nigerian State with specific reference to elections and financial regulations. In carrying out these responsibilities there have been many challenges due to several factors some of which both theories above have explained.

One of such challenge was featured in *The Punch* newspaper on 9th December, 2018. The paper disclosed that in spite of the provision of the Electoral Act 2010 which specifies the

spending limits for political parties and their candidates, there are disturbing allegations of many incumbents are using State resources to prosecute their re-election bids, campaigns or sponsor the election of their anointed candidates. The seeming inability of the bodies saddled with the monitoring capacity to take a stand on these allegations especially when it affects the ruling party is a challenge to both the principle of centralization and impartiality as postulated by Weber's School of thought on public administration.

The best that INEC has been able to do in this case of allegation is to 'warn all elected or appointed officers against the use of State resources to fund campaigns'. In one of such warnings at the commencement of campaigns for the 2019 general elections, INEC did not only warn, perhaps, having realized its own weakness as an agency, invited the EFCC to intervene in the funds related issues concerning elections especially where electoral laws guiding elections are being contravened by political parties. It was a call by INEC hinged on an attempt to 'avoid the mistake of the past, especially during the 2015 general elections where funds meant for the procurement of weapons to fight Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria were allegedly diverted to campaign purposes'.

INEC saw clearly her own weakness and sought for help from a sister agency but could not seek assistance from the higher authority whose interest is also at stake in this forth coming election. The call for help could be a synergy of public institutions towards a common goal in public interest. But where a policy in public interest is difficult to determine, it poses another challenge to resolve. And this brings up the second challenge faced by INEC on its march towards the conduct of the 2019 general elections.

The Electoral Acts 2010 was the legal tool that guided the conduct of elections in 2015. It was subjected to amendments in 2018 by the National Assembly. The amendments sought in part to achieve: mandatory use of card readers; real time on-the-spot live transmission of results

votes count; mandatory access to all party agents to inspect election materials before voting commences; mandatory access to party agents to be present during voting, collation and announcements of results; imprisonment of any INEC staff that contravene the Act and finally and more of concern to this paper parties can no longer impose arbitrary nomination fees on political aspirants.

The Bill passed prescribes limits for each elective office as follows: (a) One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N150,000) for a Ward Councillorship aspirant in the FCT; (b) Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N250,000) for an Area Council Chairmanship aspirant in the FCT; (c) Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000) for a House of Assembly aspirant; (d) One Million Naira (N1,000,000) for a House of Representatives aspirant; (e) Two Million Naira (N2,000,000) for a Senatorial aspirant; (f) Five Million naira (N5,000,000) for a Governorship aspirant; and (g) Ten Million Naira (N10,000,000) for a Presidential aspirant.

This amendment was expected to address the inability of many Nigerian youth who showed interest after the *Not- too- young to- Run* Act became law. 'Over 1000 of them across the country indicated interest to contest the 2019 general elections, however many could not contest because of the exorbitant prices of the expression of interest and nomination forms'.

It must be put on record that INEC as a public institution is making many useful attempts at re-positioning the electioneering process in Nigeria and a major step in that direction is the fact that the 2018 electoral amendment was at the instance of INEC to the National Assembly who prepared its Legislative Bill. This to INEC was a bold step to inject strength into its operation as the election umpire. Aside the bill of electoral reform initiated by INEC and the request for assistance from EFCC to discharge her duties satisfactorily to Nigerians, the body has also initiated other moves to monitor party finances with tracking devices the 2019 general elections.

Unfortunately, and in spite of the laudable efforts of INEC, the bill went back and forth

between the Legislative Chambers and the Executive four times in an attempt to reach compromise on the contents of the bill to make it signing uninterrupted. At the last count, 68 days to the general elections, the bill was finally rejected by the President on the ground of timing being too close to election time and that its signing may disrupt and bring confusion to the general election.

Interestingly, INEC that initiated the bill as a working tool did not complain about timing as the President did knowing fully that she needs the bill signed into law to empower her service delivery concerning the elections. In the event of the inability to sign the bill into law, INEC may have to rely on the 2010 Electoral Act which she feared might yet bring some avoidable problems that led to several litigations after the 2015 general elections.

The consideration given to the Electoral Act in this paper is hinged on the fact that financial regulations are also contained in the electoral laws and where the laws- the basis upon which election offences are tried is not clear from the outset prior to the election proper, it yet posed grate challenge at the level of both operation and prosecution at the courts of law. Amount of monies to charge members contesting one position or the other often create problems especially when it is costly and almost unaffordable. President Muhammadu Buhari's nomination form for example, was claimed to have been purchased by a group of people at the sum 40million naira yet, the detail of the people as to their sources of income is unknown and their identity remain clear to Nigerians.

Yet another challenge is the lack of trust and confidence in both the electoral and financial agencies of government by opposition political parties concerning a number of issues including the mode of operation. The main opposition party in Nigeria (PDP) was the first to raise alarm about their lack of confidence in the two public institutions under review in this paper. The party for example faulted the decision of INEC to delegate her power to monitor party financing to EFCC claiming that 'it is unlawful and INEC cannot delegate power delegated to

her'. The party expressed doubts in EFCC to discharge the delegated job without fear or favour to the ruling party, which has been accused severally of using EFCC to harass and intimidate other parties in the contest.

The weakness of INEC can actually be compensated for in EFCC's capacity if only all stakeholders in the electioneering process can stay within the ambit of the constitution and the Electoral Act. Unfortunately, it has been difficult as there are allegations against the Federal Government and the ruling APC about the bias in the operation of EFCC in handling allegations when it comes to ruling party and opposition parties. For example, the PDP accused the Minister of Defense in the ruling party of using the funds of the Federal Government to produce documents carrying the party's (APC) logo and the photos of the President for his campaign.

Yet, EFCC appeared not moved because it was reluctant to initiate any investigation on the issue because of affiliation. National newspapers were equally awash with allegations as these, just as there were many investigations, invitations, arrests, detentions of other political parties and their candidates including many other perceived individuals or groups that were opposed to the position of the Federal Government on issues related or not to elections.

Other celebrated cases of the bias of EFCC that worried the opposition included the alleged involvement of two Governors in corruption and/or bribery. The Governor of Kano State Abdullahi Ganduje was alleged to have received a kickback of the sum of \$5M dollars, while Governor Ayodele Fayose was also alleged to have received money from the former National Security Adviser-Col. Dasuki Sambo currently under trial for diverting money meant for soldiers to fight insurgency to election campaign of PDP government in 2015.

Under a true bureaucratic system, the handling of these matters should have been the same because the allegation and the statuses of the alleged persons were the same. Unfortunately, the EFCC handled the same matter differently to

the extent of attracting Senator Shehu Sanni (of same APC) celebrated comment in the social media that ‘the Federal Government treats corruption cases of the opposition with insecticide and she uses deodorants on her own members’. This statement was based on the manner of operation of EFCC where she would be quick and prompt to harass one and would turn her face away in another as a result of affective or traditional reasons rather than rational reason expected in a bureaucracy.

In fact, the anti- corruption advocacy group, Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), had to sue President Buhari for failing to order the probe of the bribery allegation against the Kano State Governor, Abdullahi Ganduje in spite of video clips of the bribery that went viral on the social media showing where the Governor was collecting kickback from some contractors and the preparedness of the journalist that published the video to appear in law court to attest to his publication (See Tribune 10th December, 2018). With all these scenarios in the political landscape of Nigeria, perhaps it is pertinent to ask some basic questions as: What is campaign finance? Why does public campaign financing matter? Why do oversight and monitoring matter? Why do sanctions and appeals matter? Attempt will now be made to give thoughts on these queries in the section below.

The Big-Two political parties in Nigeria APC and PDP have not conducted their party affairs in a manner pursuant to transparent spending in elections. Both have continued to reveal some unscrupulous financial improprieties before the masses of Nigeria. Before the 2015 general election when PDP was the ruling party, monies belonging to the Nigerian State were alleged to have been diverted to party activities for funding of elections; the APC then opposition before 2015 was also alleged to have been sponsored by many politicians standing trial before EFCC whose cases have been abandoned or at best rested as long as they played game of support to the APC now- the ruling party. The silence of EFCC on such party members who were accused but not prosecuted became a signal for many others outside the party who quickly de-camped to join the ruling party for ‘safety’.

4. What is Campaign Finance?

Campaign finance is an element of broader political finance. It refers to all funds raised and spent in order to promote candidates, political parties or policies in elections, referendums, initiatives, party activities and party organizations <https://openelectiondata.net>. The idea of raising funds by political parties suggest sourcing funds for political purpose, which is in a contest environment, if left unregulated, might make the contest unfair to all contestants. Generally there are two types of funding opportunities the world over. They are public and private funding available to politicians. Abati (2019) captures the reality of campaign finance thus:

many countries have written into their electoral frameworks, rules and procedures on campaign finance: to rescue democracy from money bags, the influence of money, also, to prevent the undue use of money, and to preserve the people’s sovereignty. In real terms, these rules which exist in virtually every jurisdiction, include laws and regulations which forbid the unauthorized use of state resources for political purposes, contributions from dubious sources, violation of campaign funding limits as prescribed by enabling laws, the use of money to influence voters and election outcomes, non-disclosure of campaign spending, abuse of media, broadcasting and political advertising rules, and rules on declaration of assets, academic qualifications, health and other disclosures and internal party guidelines and rules.

A country decides what funding type to adopt. Nigeria, by the electoral law, stipulates rules guiding expenditure, reporting, monitoring and sanctions about financing election process. What is not clear is the type of funding operational in Nigeria between public and private or mix funding. But going by the way campaigns are run in Nigeria, it may be convenient to say that Nigeria runs a private funding campaign style.

4.1 Why does Public Campaign Financing matter?

Where politicians receive public funding for their campaigns, it is incumbent on the recipient

to give account of how such public fund is dispensed. For any country that adopt public funding, it is also incumbent on the government to be sure that equal level playing ground is guaranteed for all contestants by preventing private funding which might make one contestant to have edge over another. In essence, the type of funding adopted by a country must be clear from the outset in order for proper monitoring, accountability, transparency and credibility.

An attempt was made to distinguish between public and private funding of campaign where 'public campaign financing includes both direct and indirect funding to political parties. Direct public campaign financing refers to funds allocated by the State to electoral contestants. Indirect public financing is when candidates or parties are granted access to some services free of charge or at a reduced rate, such access to public media, use of state property for the purpose of campaigning, printing of electoral materials or use of state postal services'. <https://openelectiondata.net>

Commenting against the backdrop of public or private campaign financing in Nigeria, the Transition Monitoring Group TMG- a non-governmental organization in support of the role of INEC on monitoring campaign funds once remarked that "experiences from previous elections have shown widespread manifestation of political corruption, possibilities of widespread electoral, vote buying and voter inducement. The implication of vote buying on Nigeria's democracy is well traversed".

What is noticeable in Nigeria in terms of funding of political parties is the opaque nature funding assumes among all parties including the ruling party. It is a process that is not clear enough to all stakeholders. Rather than support other contestants in terms of provision of facilities by the government the reverse is the case. Indeed there are instances where opposition paid to National Television for campaign purpose and such an opposition candidate and party were denied access to the facility of the Government by the ruling party in the same contest. That was the case of Alhaji

Atiku Abubakar with the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA).

Perhaps in the same vein of making sure public institutions are held accountable to the public. *The Punch* Newspaper in her editorial of 11th December 2018 remarked in part that: *Apprehension is mounting in the polity over the activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as it concerns the credibility of the 2019 general election. Matters got out of hand at the weekend when the EFCC moved against some leading members of the Peoples Democratic Party, which is seen as the strongest opposition to the President Muhammadu Buhari's second term bid. Those caught in the offensive included Doyin Okupe, the spokesperson for the party's presidential campaign, and the sons of Abubakar Atiku, the PDP's presidential candidate. More than anything else, this is an indication that the anti-corruption agency is not operating independent of the incumbent government. The trend is terrible for the election and harmful our democracy.*

A clear cut definition and truly post-modern method of running public institutions like the EFCC is needed in the present day Nigeria going by the deficiencies noticed in the bureaucratic style of the organization as it concerns election, where partisanship has completely replaced rationality in the discharge of public functions.

4.2 Why do Oversight and Monitoring matter?

If the availability of legal instruments have not curtailed sufficiently the conduct of political parties in matters relating to election campaign in Nigeria, one then wonders if there is no oversight and monitoring agencies to regulate the whole activities of politicians. But the challenge in Nigeria's case is the degree of independence of the monitoring agency to discharge unbiased tendencies in her role. Ruling parties in Nigeria irrespective of party colour will under any circumstance behave the same way. 'Oversight and monitoring of compliance with campaign finance rules are important mechanisms for enhancing the

transparency and effective implementation of regulations. States often provide for an independent oversight body that monitors the implementation of campaign finance regulations, including the publication of reports' <https://openelectiondata.net>.

Where the chairman of INEC and EFCC are both appointees of President of Nigeria and they are to oversee and monitor election campaign funds where their Principal (the President) is also a contestant with other opposition, then the delivery of the function is challenged *ab initio*. Monitoring of timely campaign finance and expenditure reports by the public, journalists, and/or civil society organizations allows them to assess the fairness of electoral competition; review the potential influences on contestants when they gain elected office. Additionally, they can use the information to hold the oversight body accountable, which can contribute to its performance. <https://openelectiondata.net>.

5. Press Coverage of Campaign / Election Spending

Unlike the INEC and EFCC, the Press does not occupy any statutory oversight position over political parties and their spending. Rather its legitimacy as the society's watchdog derives from its accolade as the fourth estate of the realm of governance. By this, the mass media owe it a duty to monitor elections and the activities of politicians in line with the stipulations of the Electoral Act. The major instrument the press uses to accomplish its sacred mandate is investigative journalism.

In Nigeria, investigative journalism received a boost in May, 2011 when the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) was signed into law. Naturally expectations were high then that with this constitutional guarantee in place, the challenge of monitoring campaign and elections spending would not be too difficult for the mass media. Unfortunately it was not long after the FoIA was promulgated than it was bogged down by other constitutional technicalities and issues of applicability and domestication. Commenting on this, Odunlami (2015:72) contends that government officials and public office holders appear not to have genuine commitment to abide

by the provisions of the law in terms of assisting the media and individuals with information that is of public interest and vital to their understanding of public issues.

All over Nigeria's political turfs are evidences of what Abati (2019) describes as the "commercialization of Nigeria's political process", and unfortunately the Press has not been able to effectively raise this issue to the plane of public discourse. Perhaps this is because the press itself has become a major actor in the constitutional breach. There is truth after all in the age-long accusation that the mass media are often implicated in the allegation of imposing and legitimizing the agenda of the ruling and political class on the masses. No further evidence would prove this fact than the awareness that many Nigerian senior journalists and editors are on the payrolls of notable politicians as consultants and spin-doctors. Add this fact to the glooming political economic reality of the Nigerian Press in which competition for political advertising spends leads to abuse of media, broadcasting and political advertising rules, the picture of the seeming helplessness and inability of the press to perform its watchdog role of surveillance and as early warning signals to fundamental constitutional breaches is complete.

The mass media no doubt have crucial roles to play especially in democratic societies towards the emergence of credible leaders and good governance. In many developing countries, like Nigeria, corruption and bad governance feed off each other and the challenge of the mass media in these climes is how to wrestle societies from the predatory claws of politicians and leaders of the public sectors. How the Press has been able to fulfill this responsibility in the 2015 and 2019 elections leaves much to be desired.

6. Concluding Remarks

Going by the recent outburst of former president Olusegun Obasanjo on the state of the nation-Nigeria that 'only a fool will sit on the fence or be neutral when his or her country is being destroyed with incompetence, corruption, lack of focus, insecurity, nepotism, brazen impunity and

denial of the obvious'. It is suspect that sanction for any erring political party that contravenes any of the financial regulation procedure will hold especially if such party or officer is of the current ruling party. In that case the journey to true democracy is yet far where the masses of the people can be confident of their representatives to deliver the goods for the society.

The need for good governance that will imbibe 'ad hoc' in service delivery is not only desirable but expedient. The expediency has to tackle situations where Nigerian Political Parties are more or less political machines with authoritarian boss or small groups of commanders who manage the support of a corps of supporters (usually campaign workers and 'militants'), who receive rewards for their efforts. As political machines, the political parties rely on patronage and spoils, in particular on public resources. (Norad Report 17, 2010).

The expediency requires the need to address the incumbency factor in her election process, which has been tagged as primary source of financial strength used in diverse ways to truncate the realization of true democratic state

All institutions of specialized control like EFCC as reviewed here in this paper that is more or less subject to the political elite's control of the state requires another look that may further strengthen her in the quest for service delivery to skew against the opposition and Nigerian masses

Finally the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as a permanent body constitutionally empowered to organize, undertake and supervise all elections lack true independence required to function independently for good governance. It is therefore suggested that all elements that make INEC tied to the apron of the government should be untied to enable her deliver and function maximally in those areas for the good of democracy and Nigerians.

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