

Functionalist Analysis of the Ideality and Necessity of Structural Violence in Human Society

CHARLES C. AKPUH

Babcock University, Ilisan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria

Abstract. Structural violence, in the form of restriction to peoples' rights and freedoms, have been a subject of controversy, with very many (if not most) of its discourses aligned to social ills. But in reality, structural violence is not always harmful, except for its lopsided perception and application by the ruling elite of the society. Rather, it has a lot of utilitarian applications for the development, stability, and sustenance of the society and its populace. Thus, there is need to create room for a sort of re-orientation on the subject. In order to contribute to proper understanding of the concept and its application as a double edged sword, this paper sought to highlight the ideality and necessity of structural violence to the proper functioning of human society to ensure sustainable development, stability, and sustainability of the society and its populace, using both primary and secondary sources. By means of some forms of rational and deductive interpretation of the collated information from the sources used, it was discovered that structural violence is ideal and necessary for the normal operation and development of people and their society, as long as they are meant for collective good; that structural violence is inevitable in human society; that it is ideal and necessary for regulating human behaviour to avoid chaos and to ensure security of lives and property; and that structural violence, however, yields the best results when collectively decided and adopted for implementation in the society. The paper, therefore, concluded that since structural violence is of great importance to proper functioning of human society, it should not be ignored; rather, its acceptable forms, which are positively oppressive (that is, functioning to limit but just for collective good), must not and cannot be done away with.

Keywords: Development, Ideality of Structural Violence, Necessity of Structural Violence, Structural Violence, Violence

1. Introduction

The study and analysis of the behavioural nature of man and the society, which he created and lives in, has often had a lot to do with speculation. This is especially so in aspects of the studies or analyses that deals with issues that go beyond the contemporary times, whether relating to the distant past or the future, in which complete facts and exhaustible information are unavailable. This paper largely borrowed from the hypothetical perceptions of the three most popular modern foundational theorists of social contract theory – Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). These theorists tried to explain the nature of human society and the need to regulate human behaviour, by an all-powerful and ultimate violence wielding entity, for the achievement and sustenance of development in the society. While the ideas of the scholars somewhat vary, they have many common areas which apply to the focus of this paper; and even though social contract theory is neither the focus of this study nor consist of its theoretical framework, this discussion borrows a lot from its applicable opinions in the different segments of the paper. This is especially because the inherent perceptions of social contract theory underpins the ideality, necessity, foundation, and progressive development of structural violence in human society, which is the focus of this paper.

In Thomas Hobbes' "Discourse on Inequality and Social Contract", he described the "State of Nature" in which conflicts and violence were rampant and continuous. In this state of nature, life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Mukherjee and Ramaswamy, 2011; Lawton and Bishop, 1977; Sabine and Thorson, 1973) and people, in their contentions with each other, could constantly experience the situation of mutual destruction of their

lives and property. According to him, it was in order for human beings to avoid these hostile experiences and the consequent stasis that led them to creating a social contract with an extremely and overall powerful entity – the Leviathan. In the contract, every individual surrendered their rights to self-defence to the Leviathan for their collective protection. Hobbes' argument further held that the subjection of all and sundry persons to the Leviathan, coupled with fear of the consequences of opposing it, to bring about the experience of peace and order in human society as against the previous prevalence of perpetual chaos (Akpoh, 2017; Lawton and Bishop, 1977; Sabine and Thorson, 1973).

The structure of this peaceful society suggests a limitation to human or individual rights of people in the discrete and collective senses. If Thomas Hobbes' description is the true origin of human society, then the structure of a "peaceful" and "orderly" society is that of acceptable restriction to human freedoms; it suggests that limitation to human freedoms is an originally engrafted component of the society. This paper examined how the foregoing structure of human society culminates into violence or the extent to which it can be translated as such, with special reference to Johan Galtung's 1969 thesis on the concept of structural violence, in which he claimed that human society will usually need the elimination of structural violence to experience positive peace. It also attempts to situate the ideality and necessity of such violence in ensuring the smooth running of human societies for the necessary developments in the contemporary times.

1.1 The Problem and Purpose of the Study

Since the introduction of Galtung's concept of structural violence in 1969 and its evolution through reviews and critiques in the later years, it has become so popular in the field of peace and conflict studies that many evolving comprehensive discussions in the field refer to it. But the ensuing interpretations and applications of the concept have been so lopsided that it seems that everything about structural violence has negative, anti-social, oppressive, anti-developmental, and unacceptable implication. For instance, the ambiguous claims, by many organisations, scholars, writers, and commentators, that poverty, inequality, and other conditions like incapacitating social stratification ultimately result from structural violence is obviously untrue and misleading, but upheld in many quarters. Examples of such claims include those of Galtung (1969), Farmer, Nizeye, Stulac, and Keshavjee (2006), Muderedzi, Eide, Braathen, and Stray-Pedersen (2017), and Centre for

Health Equality Research Chicago (CHER Chicago, 2020), whose definitions of the concept align with the foregoing. But, structural violence is, in many cases, instrumental to ensuring and maintaining various forms of security and development as opined by Akpuh (2017). Also, whereas, in many cases, human endowments combine with conscious and constant efforts of individuals and groups to separate them into social strata or classes (as evinced in the discourses of the rise of ordinary people, which include the poor, into the elite class by Adefisoye and Oluwaleye (2018), Maloy (2018), Ekundayo (2017), and Higley (2010) etc.), structural violence does not always hinder this process. In many cases, social stratification naturally result from unequal natural endowments, which the society does not create, as well as conscious efforts by the individual or groups to make progress in life. Thus, careful review and observation of the concept, its numerous discourses, and application, in relation to obvious reality in human society, suggest that it is not ideally and necessarily unacceptable in its entirety, but finds enormous relevance in human societies – ancient and contemporary – to the extent that even the authors of the lopsided perceptions cannot deny. Highlighting aspects of the inevitable ideality and necessity of structural violence to human society is the challenge of this paper.

Consequent upon the identified problem, the objectives of this study are to: Review the nature of violence in relation to when it becomes structural; examine the extent to which violence, in its plain or structured form, can be ideal, necessary, and tolerable in human society; highlight the relevance of structural violence in controlling human behaviour within the society; and underscore the utilitarian value of structural violence in achieving and promoting development in human society.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Structural Functionalism is the original 19th century perception of Hebert Spencer (1820–1903), that human society is similar to human body, having a structure, which is composed of interconnected parts, designed to function cooperatively to serve the biological and social needs of the people living in it, in order to ensure solidarity among the populace and stability of the society. Spencer argued that proper functioning of society depends on the contributions of its various components, consisting of the social institutions, belief patterns, and behaviours, which are often deliberately designed to meet the social needs (economic, educational, familial, governmental, healthcare, religious, etc.) of the

people in the society (Garner, 2019). Similarly, and in line with Spencer's ideas, Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) averred that society is bonded by shared values, languages, and symbols, which include social facts like cultural rules, customs, fashion, laws, morals, values, religious beliefs, and rituals, which all serve to regulate social life. Other philosophers (Alfred Radcliff-Brown (1881–1955); Parsons (1961); Robert Merton (1910–2003); etc.) agree with the thought that a society is considered healthy when all its components cooperate with each other for the same purposes (Lukes, 2013). Where the expected outcome is not achieved, it means that there is a dysfunction of one of the components of the society regarding the expected cooperation among them. Thus, in such a situation, the society has failed to function properly.

Although many recent sociologists and contributors to structural-functional theory have perceived the theory to be unable to explain social change; being faulty in its assumption that repetitive patterns of behaviour have a function, especially when they are repeated, a claim which disagrees with the fact that existing dysfunctions do not always serve a function; and losing its relevance as a macro-level theory, they still acknowledge its utility for some mid-level analyses of the structure of the society in relation to the expected social behaviour. The associated ideas of the society having social structure, institutions, and patterns have remained relevant as frameworks for understanding societies (Garner, 2019). For this study, it serves to explain that regulation of human behaviour, through the structure of the society, serves a function of promoting stability and persistence, as well as the development of the society and its inhabitants.

1.3 Materials and Methods

This paper is purely qualitative. The information used in the discourse were from both primary (unpublished dissertation) and secondary sources including journal articles, books, and Internet publications. The information from these sources were subjected to some forms of content analysis by way of rational and deductive explanations, which were then applied to the arguments raised herein.

2. Conceptual Review

2.1 The Meaning and Nature of Violence

Johan Galtung, in his 1969 treatise titled "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", extensively discussed the concept of violence from many dimensions. This

leading scholar, in the field of peace and conflict studies, and originator of the concept of structural violence, defined violence as a condition in which people are being negatively influenced to the point that they become unable to fully achieve their actual somatic and mental potentials (Galtung, 1969). The foregoing definition merely described 'somatic' (that is, physical/substantial) incapacitation, or deprivation by an actor, who, directly or otherwise, deprives a victim with the intention to achieve a particular consequence. Such an actor, in the context of this discourse, can be an organisation (secular or religious) or the government of the society. The application or operation of the structure (that is, laws and policies) consist of the violence meted out to the affected persons or groups, if it limits their rights to the point of preventing them from achieving their full potentials. Accordingly, in an attempt to comprehensively explain the concept of violence, Galtung arrived at the conclusion that violence consists of physical, emotional, verbal, institutional, structural or spiritual behaviour, attitude, policy or condition that actually diminishes, dominates, or destroys the full achievement of the potentials of any person or group (Denise, 2008). Although the foregoing Galtung's definition of violence has been widely critiqued (both approved and faulted) by many scholars including Coady and Vorobej, especially because of its ambiguity, it aptly applies to this paper.

To reduce the vagueness of Galtung's definition of violence, Bufacchi's definition/explanation offers some clarifications. According to Bufacchi, there are two approaches to the definition of violence – the minimalist and comprehensive approaches. While the former perceives violence as an act of intentional use of excessive force, the latter defines violence as a violation of rights (Tronto, 2010; Bufacchi, 2007). In Tronto's perception, Bufacchi's minimalist definition is a perception of violence from "...the perspective of perpetrators" (Tronto, 2010: 508), while in the comprehensive definition, he perceives it from "...the perspective of victims" ((Tronto, 2010: 508). From these two perspectives, Bufacchi alternatively coined a definition for violence, which is violation of the integrity (i.e. wholeness or intactness) of an object or a subject in such a way that robs or deprives victim of certain thing(s), whose absence in the life of the victim shatters their "...pre-existing psychological and/or physical unity that was in place before the violence took place" ((Tronto, 2010: 508).

This latter definition is similar to Galtung's definition cited earlier. Both of them, in their separate views of the concept, perceive violence as a form of

deprivation, which has the consequence of incapacitating the victim with limitations on what he/she can enjoy and achieve. Secondly, violence can be equated to both direct and indirect oppression of an entity, a person, or group by another entity, person, or group within the society. Therefore, the nature of violence is that it marginalises, dispossesses, and deprives the victim(s). Thirdly, violence is, obviously, an ambiguous concept. Because of its multiple meanings, its implication is often context-based. This tallies with the scholarly thoughts of Harris (1980), Skinner (2002), and Finlay (2017). Violence is, basically, destructive in its ordinary perception. However, in the context of its application to the structure of the civil society, as Galtung did, violence acquires dual capability of being both destructive and appropriative. It then follows that both rule of law and rule of power can both be regarded as structural violence. Nevertheless, while the former promotes the common good of the people, the latter is often detrimental to it and promotes selfishness and dishonesty.

2.2 The Concept and Characteristics of Structural Violence

According to Johan Galtung, in his 1969 thesis, violence, as defined in the foregoing, becomes structural when it is embedded in the fabrics or building blocks of a society's tenets. When a particular violence – limitation to human potential(s) for achievement of any kind – is built into the economic, political, and social structure or system of a group or groups of people, or of a society, it is a structural form of violence (Galtung, 1969). Regarding the nature of structural violence, Denise, asserted that it can be overt, as in the case of Apartheid in South Africa before 1994, or more subtle, like in the case of traditions, it can also have the tendency to award some groups privileges while limiting some others (Denise, 2008). In a similar vein, Winter and Leighton (2001: 1) explained the nature of structural violence by stating that it is:

...almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things are and always have been.

Deriving, also, from Galtung's original thesis and Weigert's (1999) later description, Lane et al (2004) further identified the nature of structural violence by describing it as a preventable harm, which does not often have an actor, that is, a perpetrator (a situation

that makes it often meaningless to search for the actor), mostly resulting from unequal distribution of resources within the society, and being built into the order of functioning of the society.

Deductively, then, structural violence exists when the cultural, economic, legal, political, and social systems of a group or groups of people contain provisions for acts which are not ordinarily taboos, but have the potential of limiting the achievement of any of the psychological, spiritual, emotional, economic, and political potentials of individuals and/or groups, who may not be part of those carrying out the said acts at any point in time. Characteristically, structural violence exists as a result of institutions, norms, practices, and traditions, which are imbedded in the lives of group members or societies. It ultimately limits the freedom of the entities, individuals, and/or groups, to achieve their full potentials. Structural violence is structurally legal and applied to human societies to limit certain unwanted human behaviour in the society. Thus, structural violence is always a barrier that is deliberate, obvious, and foreseeable. Its consequences are readily certain or at least predictable in accordance with the acceptable norms of the society.

2.3 Development

Based on the reason of its implications, development, as applied to this discourse, is a dual-directional concept. Unlike the concepts of violence and structural violence, which are conditions to which people are exposed in the society, development is a process of change that ultimately evolves in either directions – favourable or unfavourable to people. It is the process of either improving or limiting the living condition of people in the society. Although many scholars and writers (including Ibeanu, 2012 and Rodney, 1972) prefer to define development as a process of improving people's understanding of the laws of nature and the best ways of applying them, in creating tools that help improve people's conditions of existence, as well as in ensuring equitable distribution of responsibilities and rewards, this definition of the concept obviously suggests adjustment(s) or change(s) in the status quo. Therefore, in this paper, when the opposite of the foregoing perception occurs, development has also taken place.

3. Ideality and Necessity of Structural Violence

Ideality is, ordinarily, an ambiguous expression; but as applied herein, it implies the condition, quality, or state of being ideal, good, or adoptable for use. It implies the state and extent of being useful for a specific purpose. Therefore, ideality of structural violence refers to the extent to which the state of a structure of violence can be rationally and practically accepted and adopted as an ideal and useful tool for achieving certain objectives and goals in the lives of specific people, groups, or entities in the society. It is a measure of the limit of oppression to which entities, people, and groups can aspire to tolerate, live with, and function in, under a particular structure of violence adopted and applied by the society.

On the other hand, necessity describes the extent to which something is, basically, required or needed for the achievement of a specific purpose. Accordingly, then, necessity of structural violence is, as implied and applied herein, the degree to which the structure of violence can be perceived, accepted, and adopted as a basic requirement or need for achieving certain objectives and goals in the lives of specific people, groups, or entities in the society. It is a measure of how important or needful a structure of violence is or can be for proper functioning of human society.

4. Nature of Human Society and its Need of Structural Violence

Human beings who, by their natural instincts, are always desiring total or absolute freedom and unrestricted self-determination (free will) from the society. This desire for and practice of unrestricted freedom led to the original situations and experience that surrounded them before the creation of orderly human society according to Hobbes. The voluntarist tradition championed by Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Grotius suggests that the only way people can escape the depravity and brutality of life in the wild (outside the society) is to enter into society and to swear absolute allegiance to its authority (SparkNotes Editors, 2005). In fact, Karl Marx (1818-1883), while explaining the issues of religion and alienation on the society, had observed that people live in communities because they cannot survive outside their mutual dependence on the various aspects of life (Wolf and David, 2021). Part of that mutual dependence is always anchored on mutual limitation of their rights to curb the excesses of human behaviour. Although necessary limitation to human behaviour has long been established as an ideal in human society, people have always exhibited their innate desire to behave as they want because of selfishness. This is the reason such vices as murder, robbery, rape, and other forms of violence have

remained daily experiences of human societies. Being that the prevalence of these acts will always, ultimately, endanger human security and development, human societies, like Hobbes described, introduced some checks on peoples' absolute freedom. Talking about the inherent chaotic nature of human society and the unavoidable need to regulate human behaviour in it, B. F. Skinner opined, in 1971, that society can no longer afford individual freedom and self-determination. This behavioural scientist argued that human behaviour must be regulated to ensure the survival of humanity and that behavioural conditioning was necessary to be employed on a massive scale to remould human beings and human culture. It is only in this way that people could be conditioned to become humanitarian rather than selfish. Instead of allowing total individual freedom and self-determination, scientifically designed culture, which has the potential of moulding human behaviour to shape experiences in the society, has always been preferable (Skinner, 2002; Skinner, 1971).

In tandem with the lines of thought expressed in Q. Skinner (2002) and B. F. Skinner (1971), restrictions are often designed to regulate human behaviours beginning from the family, which is the basic structure of the society from and upon which other societal institutions are built. These restrictions sometimes reside in the cultural practices like the taboos of the immediate community to which one belongs or resides in; the religious group to which one belongs (in the form of instructions from religious documents like the Holy Bible or Holy Quran, or traditional religious tenets); or even from the laws of the government of the polity in which one lives. In a similar vein, while trying to highlight the importance of International Law, Akinboye and Ottoh (2009: 248) asserted that "...to live without law is to welcome anarchy". This assertion aptly applies to structural violence, whose absence will definitely encourage beastly behaviour between and among people in pursuit of their interests by all means, with the end being the only meaningful way to justify the means.

Unfortunately, the claim of the voluntarist tradition that people surrender their rights is merely an idealistic attempt to explain reality. If people could ever willingly surrender their rights to external control and limitation, the government would not need to enforce its laws to regulate their behaviour in the society (Evers, 1977). This is what Rousseau meant, in his 1762 thesis, *The Social Contract*, when he projected the idea of "forcing a man to be free". Although some of his critics accused him of

projecting totalitarianism, Rousseau did not suggest practical ban or prohibition of nearly all individual freedoms and subordination of all aspects of individual life to state control. He simply meant to say that whenever the need arises, dissident or rebellious individuals or groups (who live under the strong influence of their selfish passions to the extent of breaking the laws of the society) will usually need to be forced to conform with the general will (norms) of the society. In fact, Rousseau believed that such a force against dissidents consists of the process of refocussing them to their real interests – the collective will for collective good – the only way to ensure their own welfare as well as those of all other people in the society (Duignan and Cranston, 2021).

Rousseau's 1762 thesis, *The Social Contract*, states that "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains". In this statement, he was trying to explain the nature of human society in relation to the rights and freedoms of the citizens. Rousseau believed that one way of preventing the citizens of states/societies from living independent lives, which could make them live by "obedience to a self-imposed law" is to limit their selfish rights and freedoms. Rousseau believed that the social contract, which leads to the creation of the society, is a pledge. Therefore, the society is a pledged group. From the foregoing, therefore, it can be deduced that the self-imposed law, which an individual must obey, is the collective will of the citizens as expressed by the law of their society (Duignan and Cranston, 2021). In this situation, even if the collective will may limit the individual's achievement in life, or conflict with personal interests of an individual or a set of individuals, it cannot be regarded as structural violence as defined by Galtung. Like Hobbes, Rousseau believed that the pact that establishes civil society makes people exchange their natural rights (i.e. inherent rights acquired from God or nature) for civil rights (i.e. promissory rights of equal and indiscriminate social opportunities and protection given or assured by the government of the state/society). Rousseau perceived social contract as ideal because the surrendered natural rights (which he perceived to be usually dubious, selfish, and based on individual might) are usually conflict prone, as opposed to the civil rights (which he believed to be usually fair, collective, based on joint enforcement, and is pro-peace ((Duignan and Cranston, 2021). In my own opinion, and based on the foregoing context, the structure created by the exchange cannot be rightly perceived as violent. Even where and when it is so perceived, such violence becomes overruled by its collective/common good implication. Herein lies

the ideality and necessity of structural violence in human society.

From the foregoing, the nature of human beings and their society is such that regulations must be put in place or there will be constant chaos and limited development everywhere. For instance, imagine a Nigeria without a government and law enforcement agencies in the face of Boko Haram insurgence, Fulani herders assailment, and banditry. It is obvious that it would have been a place like the jungle, where only the fittest, who could carry arms and withstand the assailants, could survive. Every weak element of the society would have been eliminated, permanently displaced, or exiled. Thus, human control and regulation of the society for peaceful co-existence of people and for development of individuals and their environs ultimately requires limitation to human rights and freedoms. This necessity defines the contemporary nature of human society.

Although the Leviathan, in the form that Hobbes described, does not exist anymore or may not have ever existed, the leadership of the society acts like the Leviathan by regulating the society, hand-in-hand, with the component units, and based on either directly or indirectly compelled agreements. What the ruling elite, in an authoritarian society, prescribes determines the acceptable behaviour of people in the society. Conversely, in a democratic state, collective accent of the people define these restrictions. Anyone who fails to observe them therefore becomes an offender of the law of the society.

Usually, because these restrictions limit human freedoms and selfish achievements (in many cases), people consider them as violence, and because they are embedded in the very structure of the society, they are appropriately identified as structural violence. These kinds of violence can be restructured or eliminated at any time, depending on how useful they are perceived to be in the affairs of the society. As such, one can say that these types of violence can be ultimately avoided or even eliminated; but that is only when their roles have become obsolete. Otherwise, modification will be, usually, perceived as better than the elimination of such restrictions, especially for the need of peace in the society. Because of its restriction of human freedoms, structural violence is not always consented to; rather, it is often forced on people (by themselves or a higher authority like the government), because it is believed to be binding on all members of any particular society in view.

Certain conditions make structural violence to provoke the situation of non-compliance, violent reactions, and chaos. Such unwanted conditions usually exist where the government or ruling body did not pass through the normally and widely approved and legitimate process to institutionalise it. Such crisis can also occur if the restriction no longer serves the purpose for which it was created or if the condition that warrants it no longer exists; a situation in which it needs to be changed or eliminated, and the ruling body still insists that it must be retained. Moreover, autocratic tendencies, which do not allow members of the society to collectively decide how they should live in their society leads to unwanted reactions and lack of cooperation from the affected population, thereby bringing about the opposite conditions for which the restrictions were originally initiated. In accordance with the thoughts of Russell, societies must be run in ways that aid the proper adjustment of human relations to ensure that everyone can have access to as much good as may be necessarily possible for their wellbeing. This does not mean that the society must be responsible for deciding for the individual what is ultimately good for them; an impossible task, which is even unnecessary for the smooth running of the society. Moreover, since it is never the goal of any society to make its citizenry become same in their life preferences, following some extreme structural restrictions, patterned toward a particular order, Russell observed that the society needs to simply put some broad principles in place for guiding the desires of the citizens (Russel, 1917). This is the function that structural violence is ideally meant to serve.

Russell had observed that every individual has the innate tendency to desire and develop into either socially acceptable or unacceptable personality, depending on their perception of reality regarding what is their best or worst possible. However, Russell further observed that such choices will usually depend on the circumstances that the individual is exposed to, especially because the circumstances of life have the tendency to determine which capabilities (good or bad) will be developed, destroyed, strengthened, weakened, or gradually diverted/converted into an opposite form. Nevertheless, it is obvious that undesirable capabilities (good or bad) can mostly, if not only, be suppressed and diverted, they can hardly be destroyed (Russel, 1917).

Furthermore, the innate tendency of societies to unequally restrict the rights and freedoms of their citizens and other elements within their jurisdiction is a common factor in people's anti-structural violence

postures. But this is a natural problem, which has been inevitable and insurmountable. Karl Marx had wrongly blamed religion for this persistent problem of inequality. According to him, it was because of religion's inability to create a real community of people, who are truly equal in the eyes of God, that modern state falsely assumed that role after the Reformation (Wolf and David, 2021). Even though it is reasonable to agree with Marx's assertion that the modern society/state merely creates a mirage of social condition of equality of citizens, it has been able to always control human behaviour to allow for tolerance and co-habitation, thereby, limiting the extremely brutish and conflict-ridden nature of the original human society described by Hobbes. However, it must be stated, at this juncture, that Marx's idea of a transcendent and genuine community of social and economic equals is, basically, utopian. The same ills of inequality and alienation originally created by religion and adopted by the political society/state, as explained by Marx, exists in both the capitalist and communist/socialist states. Human inequality has no cure. This is why the disfavoured people will always protest against structural violence. Outside these conditions, people usually and largely tolerate structural violence. Except under the stated conditions, people hardly perceive the society's restrictions to their rights and freedoms as violence.

As law, a condition similar in posture to law, or rather an aspect of obvious social rule, which may be stated, written, or otherwise, the breach of structural violence is inevitable in the society. Therefore, the leadership of every society ensures that consequences, that are punishment, which can ably deter its subjects from breaking the rules of human relations within the society, are put in place.

5. Structural Violence and Development

Conditions of compulsory control of human behaviour must exist before development can take place, otherwise, the resultant chaos from absolute freedom will usually ruin any achievement made in the society. Control of human behaviour does not ultimately bring about absence of conflict, or absolute prevalence of peace. However, it helps to minimize conflict and to conversely enhance peace alongside development, even though the peace may be forced and, therefore, temporary. Thus, structural violence, in the forms of regulations for smooth running of the society, is ultimately ideal and necessary for development to take place. More so, this kind of restriction is inevitably needed for maintaining or sustaining any development it brings

about. Thus, structural violence is necessary for development, and development is largely dependent on it.

6. Conclusion

Certain forms of structural violence are ultimately ideal and necessary for the normal operation and development of people and their society. Although certain forms of it can be avoided in some circumstances, structural violence cannot be eliminated from human society, especially if orderliness and reasonable development are to be achieved. Thus, it is ideal and necessary for regulating human behaviour to avoid chaos and to ensure security of lives and property; but structural violence yields the best results when collectively decided and adopted for implementation in the society. The utility of structural violence to proper functioning of human society cannot be overemphasised. Therefore, its acceptable forms, which are positively oppressive (that is, functioning to limit but just for collective good), must not and cannot be done away with.

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Acknowledgement

This article was developed from a paper titled Necessity of Structural Violence in Human Society, which was written by the author in a PhD class in partial fulfilment of the requirements for PLSC 904 – Seminar in Political Science II – International Relations, Diplomacy, and Peace and Conflict Studies, taught by Prof. A.D. Aina and Dr. Ayuba Mavalla, at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University in April 2013. Also, a tangible aspect of it was extracted from the author's 2017 Ph.D. dissertation cited elsewhere in this paper.